By Ioannis Serefas

Introduction

This paper aims to examine how El Salvador’s democratically elected president, Nayib Bukele, has established an authoritarian regime by leveraging modern communication tools and deploying anti-establishment rhetoric. It explores how his government has eroded democratic institutions and political freedoms under the guise of ensuring internal security. The analysis investigates efforts to centralize power in the presidency, including the abuse of emergency powers and mass arrests ostensibly targeting gang-related violence—policies that have severely undermined democratic governance. The final section assesses the impact of Bukele’s rule on Salvadoran society and considers whether his model has influenced similar leadership styles elsewhere. The conclusion evaluates the extent to which Bukele’s approach represents a modern form of authoritarianism.

The path to the presidency

On 3 February 2019, Nayib Bukele was elected President of El Salvador in the first round, securing 53% of the popular vote. It was the first time since the end of the civil war in 1992 that a president was elected from outside the two traditional parties: the right-wing ARENA and the left-wing FMLN (Aleman, 2019). Bukele had previously served as mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán (2012–2015) and of San Salvador (2015–2018), both times under the FMLN banner. After criticizing the party leadership, he left the FMLN in 2017 and ran for president under the small conservative party GANA (Aleman, 2019).

A major factor in Bukele’s rise was widespread public frustration with endemic corruption (Gies, 2019). Three of the four presidents before him faced allegations of embezzling millions of public funds. He ran on a strong anti-corruption platform, highlighting scandals that plagued both major parties. Gies (2023) notes that former ARENA president Saca was imprisoned, while former FMLN president Funes fled to Nicaragua to evade prosecution. Bukele’s victory thus signaled public rejection of both the two-party system and the entrenched left-right divide (Montoya, 2019).

Another key issue was public concern over crime. Gang violence had driven mass emigration, especially to the United States. Between 2014 and 2017, over 20,000 Salvadorans were killed, and there were allegations that both major parties paid gangs for votes during the 2014 elections (Ingber, 2019).

Economic instability also contributed to Bukele’s popularity. In 2019, El Salvador’s public debt reached 70% of GDP, with per capita debt estimated at $4,300 (World Bank, 2025). Youth unemployment hindered development while crime and lack of opportunity fueled emigration of the country’s youth. Bukele’s tenure as mayor of the capital gave many voters hope he could improve national economic conditions (Gies, 2019).

Bukele’s strategic use of social media and anti-establishment messaging also helped him dominate traditional parties (Call, 2019). He communicated directly with citizens via Facebook and Twitter, often dressed casually, and denounced corruption while promoting universal healthcare and education. His blunt and confrontational style resonated with younger, disillusioned voters (Call, 2019).

Ultimately, Bukele positioned himself as a fresh alternative to the “corrupt old guard,” tapping into public disillusionment with institutions (Zovatto, 2019). Many citizens, as Zovatto notes, prioritized practical solutions over democratic values and were indifferent to whether the new government was democratic or authoritarian.

Authoritarian governance

Since taking office in 2019, Bukele has increasingly consolidated power by concentrating it under his control (Brigida, 2020). In February 2020, he entered parliament with soldiers to pressure lawmakers into approving a $109 million security budget. He accused the legislature of corruption and not serving the interests of the people, reintroducing the military into politics and highlighting the enduring conflict between executive and legislative branches in Latin America political systems (Brigida, 2020). According to Brigida, the military has since assumed a more prominent political role.

In March 2021, Bukele’s party and allies secured 61 of 84 seats in Congress. This absolute majority dramatically increased his power and allowed him to appoint loyalists to the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office—both previously sources of institutional resistance (Al Jazeera, 2021). On 1 May 2021, the newly elected Assembly removed five Constitutional Court judges and the Attorney General, on the grounds that they were obstructing the government’s policy to tackle the pandemic prompting accusations of a coup attempt and condemnation from international bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS, 2021).

In September 2021, the newly reconstituted pro-Bukele Supreme Court ruled that presidents could seek immediate re-election, contradicting the Constitution’s explicit prohibition (WOLA, 2021). This decision paved the way for Bukele’s 2024 re-election bid.

Bukele has also sought to dominate public discourse. His administration employed online specialists to create fake pro-government accounts and suppress dissenting voices through mass reporting (Kinosian, 2022). Numerous journalists expressed concerns over their physical safety while several journalists’ phones were reportedly infected with Pegasus spyware, and the government increased funding to pro-Bukele media channels.

Under Bukele, El Salvador became hostile towards independent press. Between March and August 2024, 136 attacks on journalists were recorded (Dardón, 2024). Human rights defenders and political opponents have faced arrests and threats. The state of emergency, originally declared to combat gangs, has been used to target independent media. Journalist Victor Barahona’s 2023 arrest exemplified the growing climate of fear (CPJ, 2023).

In March 2022, following recurrent incidents of violence between gang members, a new state of emergency suspended key constitutional rights, including the presumption of innocence, access to legal counsel, and protection from arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The National Assembly voted in favor of the implementation of stricter penalties or juveniles associated with illegal organizations, as well as the extension of mandatory pretrial detention. More than 80,000 people—including over 3,000 minors—have been detained, many based on appearance or anonymous accusations. Detained individuals include union and community leaders unconnected to any gang activity (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

El Salvador now has 108,000 prisoners—3% of the male population—far exceeding its prison capacity (Amnesty International, 2024). A new mega-prison, the “Terrorism Containment Center,” was built to hold 40,000 inmates. Prison conditions are inhumane: limited food, lack of medical care, and reports of torture. Over 300 deaths have been recorded, while human rights monitors have been denied access (Amnesty International, 2024).

In November 2024, Bukele admitted that 8,000 of those arrested were innocent and ordered their release (Dardón, 2024). However, the true number may be higher. The opacity of the judicial process and police restrictions on information make verification difficult.

Importantly, the large-scale repression was made possible by earlier institutional capture. Bukele first gained control over the judiciary and legislature in 2020–21, before launching the state of emergency in 2022 (Meléndez-Sánchez & Vergara, 2024). Authoritarian consolidation enabled, rather than followed, the repressive crackdown: Bukele first concentrated legislative and judicial power under his control in 2020-21 and then declared a state of emergency and organized extensive operations against gangs in 2022

The outcome of Bukele’s governance

  

In February 2024, Bukele was re-elected with 80% of the vote, benefiting from the Supreme Court’s reversal of the re-election ban. His resounding electoral success is attributed to his stringent policy against gang violence, which has resulted in a historic decrease in the homicide rate after large-scale arrests. Bukele has characterized El Salvador as a “safe country” (Kinosian & Renteria, 2024). According to Kinosian and Renteria, the citizens of El Salvador voted primarily in favor of increased security measures, disregarding concerns regarding the erosion of democracy. Following the electoral defeat of the opposition, now emboldened, Bukele may seek to revise the Constitution—raising concerns about the potential abolition of term limits.

Despite Bukele’ popularity El Salvador’s economic situation remains dire (Dardón, 2024). El Salvador has experienced the slowest economic growth in Latin America, since Bukele took office, with more than a quarter of the population living in poverty. Extreme poverty has doubled, and private investment has declined, despite the strategic implementation of tax-free cryptocurrency Bitcoin to attract such investment. The government negotiated a $1.3 billion bailout package with the IMF, which described the country’s economic situation as fragile. Simultaneously, mass layoffs in public sectors such as healthcare, the Supreme Electoral Court and the Ministry of Culture have provoked a reaction from citizens, who perceive these as violations of job protection in the public sector. However, trade unions remain largely silent, following the closure of 50 unions and the dismissal of over 500 union leaders, including 80 who protested peacefully (Dardón, 2024).

Corruption remains widespread, with allegations of financial gains by Bukele’s family (Human rights Watch, 2024). According to the same source, there has been a marked restriction on access to public information, with abortion being criminalized, and members of the LGBTQI+ community facing discrimination.

Bukele’s model of governance gained attention across Latin America (Meléndez-Sánchez & Vergara, 2024). Following their meeting at the White House, Donald Trump expressed his admiration for Bukele’s practices and rhetoric, causing concern within the US (Graham, 2025). In addition, Bukele has inspired leaders confronting analogous criminal challenges in nations such as Xiomara Castro in Honduras and Daniel Noboa in Ecuador (Meléndez-Sánchez & Vergara, 2024). However, their efforts have largely failed due to differing conditions. Unlike in El Salvador, these leaders lacked control over both the judiciary and legislature, and their gang populations responded more cohesively. (Smith et al., 2022). In addition, the citizens of El Salvador accepted state arbitrariness for the sake of security, while the international community was slow to react forcefully, in contrast to the cases of Honduras and Ecuador. Despite the apparent simplicity of the Bukele model, its success is contingent on specific local circumstances (Meléndez-Sánchez & Vergara, 2024).

Conclusions

Nayib Bukele’s presidency exemplifies a modern form of authoritarianism—one that does not rely on military coups but instead consolidates power through elections and institutional capture. Bukele capitalized on public dissatisfaction with corruption among established parties and their failure to address pressing concerns such as crime and economic inequality to win office. He built a strong political brand using social media and anti-elite messaging.

Once in power, Bukele systematically dismantled institutional checks and balances, exerted control over the judiciary and legislature, and weakened civil liberties. The prolonged state of emergency enabled mass arrests and repression under the pretext of security. Though crime has decreased, the cost has been high: wrongful detentions, overcrowding of prisons and inhumane prison conditions, and the normalization of state arbitrariness.

  His 2024 re-election, demonstrated that Salvadorans, facing persistent insecurity, were willing to sacrifice democratic norms for safety. Despite the decline in crime, El Salvador continues to struggle with poverty, economic development, freedom of the press, and gender inequalities.

  Attempts to replicate Bukele’s model in countries such as Honduras and Ecuador have largely failed, illustrating the importance of local context—particularly institutional control and public acquiescence—in enabling authoritarian governance.

Ultimately, Bukele’s regime challenges the resilience of democratic institutions in Latin America. It raises critical questions about the balance between security and freedom, and the role of the international community in defending human rights and democratic values.

References

  

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